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COMMENT
WHAT HAPPENS IF AUTOPSY REPORTS
ARE FOUND TESTIMONIAL?:
THE NEXT STEPS TO ENSURE THE
ADMISSIBILITY OF THESE CRITICAL
DOCUMENTS IN CRIMINAL TRIALS
Dana Amato*
The Sixth Amendment guarantees a criminal defendant the right to
confront the witnesses against her. This right to confrontation, known as the
Confrontation Clause, applies to hearsay testimony. Therefore, even if a
hearsay statement is admissible pursuant to the Federal Rules of Evidence,
the Sixth Amendment may prohibit its admission. Whether hearsay runs
afoul of the Confrontation Clause depends on whether that hearsay is
“testimonial” in nature. However, the Supreme Court has refused to define
“testimonial.” Furthermore, what little guidance the Court has released
about the correct interpretation of “testimonial” is fractured, conflicting,
and confusing. This is especially troubling with respect to forensic hearsay
documents because of their importance in criminal trials as well as their
ubiquity and variety. Chief among these problematic documents is the
autopsy report—an integral and controversial incarnation of forensic
hearsay. Due to splits at the state and federal levels regarding the correct
interpretation of this rule with respect to autopsy reports, as well as the
high-stakes nature of its answer, this Comment argues that it is likely the
Court will eventually consider the issue. Furthermore, it predicts that the
outcome will be pose problems for prosecutors of murder cases. Therefore,

* J.D., Northwestern University Pritzker School of Law, 2017. B.A. in English,
Philosophy, and Classical Studies, Seton Hall University, 2014. Thanks to my father for his
endless encouragement and support of my dream to obtain a law degree. Thanks to Drew
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this Comment proposes a solution that might ensure the admissibility of
these critical documents in criminal cases even if the Court’s ultimate
ruling is problematic.
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INTRODUCTION
The Sixth Amendment of the Constitution provides that a criminal
defendant has the right to be “confronted with the witnesses against him.”1
This provision is commonly referred to as the “Confrontation Clause.” The
U.S. Supreme Court radically changed its view of the Confrontation Clause
in 2004 with Crawford v. Washington,2 a case which imposed a new
fulcrum for Confrontation Clause cases: testimonial status.3 Under the old
precedent, hearsay statements were admissible when the declarant was
unavailable for trial but the statements contained sufficient “indicia of
reliability” or “particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.”4 However,
Crawford changed the inquiry: if a hearsay statement is offered against the

1

U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
541 U.S. 36 (2004).
3
Id. at 53 (“In sum, even if the Sixth Amendment is not solely concerned with
testimonial hearsay, that is its primary object . . . .”).
4
Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980), abrogated by Crawford v. Washington, 541
U.S. 36 (2004).
2
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defendant in a criminal trial and its declarant does not testify, the statement
is inadmissible for its truth if the statement is “testimonial” in nature,
without any question about the statement’s independent reliability.5
Although the word “testimonial” is found nowhere in the text of the
Confrontation Clause, the word testimonial became the central point upon
which all post-Crawford cases turned.6 The Supreme Court has openly
refused to define the word and has not produced coherent guidance to the
lower courts on how to implement this precedent.7
One of the more severe consequences of Crawford and its progeny is
the lack of clarity surrounding a certain type of hearsay integral to many
murder trials across the country: autopsy reports. Although the Court has
heard some cases regarding the admissibility of other types of forensic
hearsay in the event of declarant unavailability, it has flatly refused to take
up a case concerning the testimonial status of autopsy reports, despite a
recent opportunity to do so.8
This Comment will make three main arguments about this issue. First,
confusion in lower courts, the significant circuit and state splits on the
issue, and the sheer importance of autopsy reports to the criminal justice
system all make it more likely that the Supreme Court will grant certiorari
on this issue. Moreover, whether autopsy reports are admissible in
“declarant-unavailable” situations9 is a clear question that warrants a clear

5

Id. at 53–54 (majority opinion).
See infra Part II.
7
See infra Part II.
8
See infra Part II for a discussion on Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Medina v. Arizona,
134 S. Ct. 1309, 1309 (2014) (raising the sole issue on appeal as to “[w]hether an autopsy
report created as part of a homicide investigation, and asserting that the death was indeed
caused by homicide, is ‘testimonial’ under the Confrontation Clause framework established
in [Crawford]”).
9
The Federal Rules of Evidence govern the admissibility of evidence when the
declarant is unavailable:
6

(a) A declarant is considered to be unavailable as a witness if the declarant:
(1) is exempted from testifying about the subject matter of the declarant’s statement because
the court rules that a privilege applies;
(2) refuses to testify about the subject matter despite a court order to do so; (3) testifies to not
remembering the subject matter;
(4) cannot be present or testify at the trial or hearing because of death or a then-existing
infirmity, physical illness, or mental illness; or
(5) is absent from the trial or hearing and the statement’s proponent has not been able, by
process or other reasonable means, to procure:
(A) the declarant’s attendance, in the case of a hearsay exception under Rule 804(b)(1) or
(6); or
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answer. Second, it is likely, based on existing precedent and the opinions
authored by multiple justices on this topic, that the Court could find autopsy
reports testimonial for the purpose of the Confrontation Clause. Lastly, this
Comment explains the problem that results from this finding—namely,
barring the admission of an autopsy report where its creator is unavailable
for trial—and proposes an interdisciplinary solution to that problem. This
Comment proposes that the medical community should enact a national
standard for conducting autopsy reports. This standard should mandate
preservation of the autopsy procedure with the explicit intent that future
experts will be able to look at the report to draw independent conclusions
without having to rely on the testimonial opinions of the original medical
examiner.
I. BACKGROUND
In order to fully appreciate the complexity of this evidentiary issue,
some background on the evolution of the law is necessary. The Supreme
Court’s jurisprudence on what counts as “testimonial” under the
Confrontation Clause is at best unclear and at worst irreconcilable.10 The
Court has a tendency to push off the difficult task of providing a concrete
definition for “testimonial” evidence in favor of embracing a fact-specific
analysis of the evidence in each case.11 As a result, the current law has been
interpreted in varying (often contradictory) ways by federal circuit and state
courts alike.12
A. WHAT THE SUPREME COURT SAID

Justice Scalia, writing for the Court in Crawford, abrogated previous
Confrontation Clause precedent from the 1980s.13 Crawford is now
considered the landmark decision of current Confrontation Clause

(B) the declarant’s attendance or testimony, in the case of a hearsay exception under Rule
804(b)(2), (3), or (4).

FED. R. EVID. 804.
10
See, e.g., Melendez–Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 331 (2009) (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting) (“Now, without guidance from any established body of law, the States can only
guess what future rules this Court will distill from the sparse constitutional text.”).
11
See, e.g., Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68 (2004).
12
See infra, pp. 18–26 (discussing the splits among the circuit and state courts).
13
541 U.S. at 67. See generally Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980) abrogated by
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004) (codifying a two-part test for the admissibility
of testimonial evidence in declarant-unavailable situations: (1) the state must make a goodfaith effort to locate the unavailable witness and (2) the state must prove that the evidence
carries sufficient indicia of trustworthiness).
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jurisprudence.14 The defendant in Crawford was tried for assault and
attempted murder.15 The state offered into evidence an incriminating,
previously recorded statement made to the police by the defendant’s wife,
who did not testify at his trial.16 The defendant argued that admission of this
evidence violated his Sixth Amendment right to be “confronted with
witnesses against him.”17 The Washington trial court had originally
admitted the statement under the Ohio v. Roberts18 standard, namely
because the statement had sufficient indicia of reliability.19 Still, under the
Roberts standard, the appellate court of Washington reversed the trial
court’s decision on the ground that parts of the statement were sufficiently
reliable, but others were not.20 Finally, the Supreme Court of Washington
reversed the appellate court decision, finding the statements sufficiently
reliable and therefore admissible because the statement “sufficiently
interlocked” with the defendant’s own statements, thereby meeting the
Roberts standard.21
The Supreme Court, however, agreed with the defendant’s
arguments.22 In doing so, the Supreme Court established a new rule: any
evidence that is “testimonial”—even if such evidence does not come from a
live witness—triggers the defendant’s rights under the Confrontation
Clause.23 In declaring this new rule, Justice Scalia reasoned, “the
[Confrontation] Clause’s ultimate goal is to ensure reliability of evidence,
but it is a procedural rather than a substantive guarantee. It commands, not
that evidence be reliable, but that reliability be assessed in a particular
manner: by testing in the crucible of cross-examination.”24 The Court
refused to further explain its new understanding of the Confrontation
Clause. Sidestepping the issue of exactly what “testimonial evidence” looks
like, the Court declared “[w]e leave for another day any effort to spell out a

14
Daniel J. Capra & Joseph Tartakovsky, Autopsy Reports and the Confrontation
Clause: A Presumption of Admissibility, 2 VA. J. CRIM. L. 62, 66 (2014).
15
541 U.S. at 40.
16
Id.
17
Id.
18
448 U.S. 56 (1980), abrogated by Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
19
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 36.
20
State v. Crawford, 107 Wash. App. 1025, 1025 (2001), rev’d, 147 Wash. 2d 424
(2002), rev’d and remanded, 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
21
State v. Crawford, 147 Wash. 2d 424, 427 (2002), rev’d and remanded, 541 U.S. 36
(2004).
22
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68–69.
23
Id. at 40.
24
Id. at 61.
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comprehensive definition of ‘testimonial.’”25 It did provide a list of
examples, however, including but not limited to “prior testimony at a
preliminary hearing, before a grand jury, or at a former trial; and . . . police
interrogations.”26 The Supreme Court’s justification for classifying the
aforementioned evidence as categorically testimonial lies with the
documents’ “clos[e] kinship to the abuses at which the Confrontation
Clause was [originally] directed.”27
Chief Justice Rehnquist presciently asserted that by unnecessarily
overturning Roberts, the decision in Crawford “casts a mantle of
uncertainty over future criminal trials in both federal and state
courts . . . .”28 This concurrence shows that the trouble Crawford would
cause was recognized at the inception of the doctrine.29
The next key case regarding the testimonial nature of certain hearsay
evidence was Davis v. Washington,30 a 9–0 decision in favor of the
respondent, the State of Indiana.31 In that case, the Supreme Court clarified
that:
Without attempting to produce an exhaustive classification of all conceivable
statements—or even all conceivable statements in response to police interrogation—
as either testimonial or nontestimonial, it suffices to decide the present cases to hold
as follows: Statements are nontestimonial when made in the course of police
interrogation under circumstances objectively indicating that the primary purpose of
the interrogation is to enable police assistance to meet an ongoing emergency. They
are testimonial when the circumstances objectively indicate that there is no such
ongoing emergency, and that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to establish or
32
prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution.

In other words, if the primary purpose of the hearsay statement was to aid
police during an emergency—for example, “The man who shot her turned
left down the street!”—the hearsay statement is nontestimonial. This is
because the statement, when said, was not intended to accuse anyone of

25

Id. at 68.
Id.
27
Id.
28
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 69 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
29
Note that Chief Justice Rehnquist’s concurrence was mainly concerned with (what he
considered to be) the arbitrary and spontaneous distinction that appeared between testimonial
and non-testimonial statements in the majority opinion. Id. at 71. His immediate reservation
regarding the lack of clarity Crawford provides to lower courts, coupled with the confusion
that actually ensued, supports this Comment’s argument that the Court should hear another
Confrontation Clause case.
30
547 U.S. 813 (2006).
31
Id. at 834.
32
Id. at 822 (emphasis added).
26
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wrongdoing (as the purpose of the statement would be in a courtroom), but
rather it was said to assist police during an emergency. A statement made at
the time of an emergency to the police is exempt from some of the general
dangers of hearsay statements, such as the fear that the declarant is lying or
misremembering what occurred; therefore, the ability to cross-examination
the declarant is far less important.33 On the other hand, the same statement
“The man who shot her turned left down the street,” could be testimonial if
the emergency were no longer occurring; for example, if it were said to the
police in an interview the following day. Without the contemporaneousness
and urgency of the ongoing emergency, the statement in this context is no
different than any other hearsay statement, and thus poses the same dangers
(e.g., honesty or reliability).34 A statement made without the pressure of
emergency is testimonial because it is intended to provide some kind of
evidence (or testimony) against an individual; therefore, the right of the
defendant to cross-examine the declarant should be strictly protected.
The first Supreme Court case dealing with the testimonial status of
forensic documents came three years after Davis, in Melendez–Diaz v.
Massachusetts,35 where the Court ruled that forensic reports could be
testimonial.36 The reports in question in that case were “certificates”
provided by state laboratory analysts, which stated that the substance seized
by the police in connection with the defendant’s trial was cocaine.37 Justice
Scalia again wrote for the Court, describing the certificates as
“declaration [s] [sic] of facts written down and sworn to by the declarant
before an officer authorized to administer oaths,” making them “quite
plainly affidavits,” which are categorically testimonial pursuant to
Crawford.38 It is important to note that the certificates were determined to
be testimonial even though the documents themselves did not accuse the
defendant of wrongdoing.39 Justice Scalia noted that it was sufficient for the
documents to “provid[e] testimony against petitioner, proving one fact
necessary for his conviction—that the substance he possessed was
cocaine.”40 In other words, the documents were substituted for the
testimony that the analysts would have given if called as witnesses at trial.
33
Ronald J. Allen, et al., The Hearsay Rule, in EVIDENCE: TEXT, PROBLEMS, AND CASES
414–20 (2002).
34
Id.
35
557 U.S. 305 (2009).
36
Id. at 310–11.
37
Id. at 307.
38
Id. at 310 (quoting BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 62 (8th ed. 2004)).
39
Id. at 313.
40
Id.
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Thus, Crawford’s prohibition against testimonial hearsay barred their
admission regardless of whether the defendant was personally mentioned in
the documents themselves.41 This same argument would later apply to the
debate about the testimonial nature of autopsy reports.
Melendez–Diaz was a 5–4 opinion, in which many of the justices
submitted their own individual concurrences, distancing themselves from
certain specific points made by the majority. Justice Thomas concurred
alone, defending his pre-Crawford stance that the Confrontation Clause is
only implicated in “formalized testimonial materials, such as affidavits,”
and limiting his agreement with the majority to the finding that the
certificates were affidavits and therefore testimonial.42 Justice Kennedy
vehemently dissented, joined by Justices Breyer, Alito, and Chief Justice
Roberts.43 The dissent was incredulous toward the majority’s choice to
“confidently disregard[] a century of jurisprudence” and to “swee[p] away
an accepted rule governing the admission of scientific evidence.”44
Moreover, the dissent accuses the majority of now forcing upon the States
“an even more onerous burden than they did before Crawford. . . . Now,
without guidance from any established body of law, the States can only
guess what future rules this Court will distill from the sparse constitutional
text.”45 Recall that the sparse text of the U.S. Constitution does not contain
the word “testimonial,” let alone a definition for it.46 The Melendez–Diaz
dissent too warned of the dangers of such a precedent, specifically the
inability of lower courts to predict future applications of the holding due to
“the breadth of the Court’s ruling . . . and its undefined scope.”47 In
particular, Justice Kennedy identifies the danger it could pose to “the range
of other scientific tests that may be affected,” including autopsies.48 He
reasons that in the event of a medical examiner’s unavailability at trial, the
categorical exclusion of surrogate testimony for such tests could potentially
create a statute of limitations for murder.49 This particular reservation of
41

Id. at 313.
Id. at 329 (Thomas, J., concurring) (citing White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 365
(1992)).
43
Id. at 330 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
44
Id.
45
Id. at 331.
46
See U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
47
Melendez–Diaz, 557 U.S. at 337 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
48
Id. at 335.
49
Id. The fear is that this situation would exist in any murder case tried after the original
autopsy performer has died. Once the original author of the document becomes unavailable,
the autopsy becomes inadmissible. Therefore, cases that rely on the admission of autopsy
reports to succeed have an expiration date—namely the life of the author. This would
42
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Justice Kennedy’s would become a refrain for those advocating against a
testimonial label for autopsy reports.50
Just two years later, the Court ruled in Bullcoming v. New Mexico51
that the analyst who performs the test and creates the forensic report must
testify.52 In Bullcoming, the document in question was a blood-alcohol
report in a drunk driving trial.53 Justice Ginsberg wrote for the Court this
time, establishing that “[i]n all material respects, the [blood-alcohol]
report . . . resembles those in Melendez–Diaz.”54 Even though the
prosecution had produced a witness who knew the general laboratory
procedures but did not perform or observe the test in question himself,55 the
report was deemed inadmissible testimonial hearsay.56 Justices Kagan and
Sotomayor joined the opinion in part, with Justice Sotomayor filing a short
separate opinion;57 Justice Thomas joined in all but the parts from which
Justices Kagan and Sotomayor distanced themselves, with an additional
removal;58 and Justice Kennedy authored a dissent, in which Chief Justice
Roberts and Justices Breyer and Alito joined.59
The Court’s Bullcoming opinion was a 5–4 split, but it is clear that the
individual justices were even more conflicted on the appropriate analysis of
this issue than such a split might suggest. Justices Kagan60 and Sotomayor61
joined the opinion in all but the part that discusses the burdens imposed in
requiring the “analyst” of a report to testify at trial. Justice Sotomayor went

function as a de facto statute of limitations on murder.
50
See, e.g., Reid R. Allison, Confronting the Dead: The Supreme Court’s Confrontation
Clause Jurisprudence and its Implications for Autopsy Reports, 1 CRIM. L. PRAC. 23, 32
(2013) (noting that Justice Kennedy’s remark “had led commentators to caution that barring
introduction of autopsy reports could in effect create a statute of limitations for murder, a
patently unacceptable result as indicated by the fact that states normally do not have a statute
of limitations for murder”).
51
564 U.S. 647 (2011).
52
Id. at 657–58.
53
Id. at 655.
54
Id. at 664.
55
Witnesses who take “the place of another as a successor or substitute,” such as a
witness with no personal knowledge of the analysis in question but who is familiar with the
way analyses of that type are conducted, or a witness who is familiar with the results of the
analysis in a specific case, are commonly referred to as “surrogates” or “surrogate
witnesses.” BRYAN A. GARNER, GARNER’S DICTIONARY OF LEGAL USAGE 871 (3d ed. 2011).
56
Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 564 U.S. 647, 647–50 (2011).
57
Id. at 651 n.†, 668.
58
Id. at 651 n.†.
59
Id. at 674.
60
Id. at 651 n.†.
61
Id. at 668.
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even further by authoring her own concurrence which insisted that the
proper analysis turned on the test articulated Davis,62 and “emphasiz[ing]
the limited reach of the Court’s opinion.”63 Justice Thomas followed suit,
but took the additional step of distancing himself from statements made in a
particular footnote in the majority opinion as well.64 Justice Kennedy’s
dissent (which is, ironically, the only portion of the opinion where more
than two justices fully agree on the reasoning put forth), emphasizes the
“serious misstep” of the Court to extend its Melendez–Diaz holding to a
circumstance in which a knowledgeable laboratory employee was present to
testify, but could not do so admissibly because he was not the analyst who
transcribed the computerized blood-alcohol test onto the document itself.65
In 2012, the Court heard Williams v. Illinois,66 in which the state had
offered a DNA profile against the defendant by means of a forensic
specialist from the Illinois State Police Laboratory.67 The forensic specialist
testified that she matched a DNA profile produced by an outside laboratory
to the profile produced by the state lab from a sample of the defendant’s
blood.68 The Court found that the specialist’s testimony regarding the
outside laboratory’s results was admissible, even though she was
technically testifying to the testimonial statements of others.69 Justice Alito,
writing for the plurality, reaffirmed that the Court’s recent jurisprudence,
“while departing from prior Confrontation Clause precedent in other
respects,” does not extend to testimony regarding the data underlying an
expert’s conclusion (which would not be hearsay at all because the
62

Id.; see also Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 814 (2006) (holding that statements
are testimonial when their “primary purpose” is to establish or prove past events potentially
relevant to later criminal prosecution). Justice Sotomayor insisted that the proper test to
apply was whether the blood alcohol reports were made to stop an ongoing emergency or to
preserve evidence, perhaps for use at a future trial. Bullcoming, 564 U.S. at 668 (Sotomayor,
J., concurring).
63
Bullcoming, 564 U.S. at 668 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
64
Id. at 659 n.6.
To rank as “testimonial,” a statement must have a “primary purpose” of “establish[ing] or
prov[ing] past events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution.” Elaborating on the
purpose for which a “testimonial report” is created, we observed in Melendez–Diaz that business
and public records ‘are generally admissible absent confrontation . . . because—having been
created for the administration of an entity’s affairs and not for the purpose of establishing or
proving some fact at trial—they are not testimonial.

Id. (internal citations omitted).
65
Id. at 674 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
66
132 S. Ct. 2221 (2012) (plurality opinion).
67
Id. at 2227.
68
Id. at 2229–31.
69
Id. at 2243–44.
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statements would not be admitted for their truth).70 Furthermore, Justice
Alito reaffirmed that the outside lab report did not identify a “targeted
individual” since the lab was not aware of the defendant’s identity;
therefore, the report was not testimonial because the “primary purpose” of
the statements contained therein was not to accuse the defendant of
engaging in criminal conduct.71
Although the case produced another 5–4 split, Justice Alito’s opinion
in Williams speaks for only a plurality of the justices, including Chief
Justice Roberts and Justice Kennedy. Justice Breyer filed a separate
concurrence,72 Justice Thomas concurred only in the judgment,73 and the
remaining justices cleanly dissented.74
Justice Breyer’s concurrence focuses mainly on a problem he believed
was not addressed by the plurality nor the dissent: “How does the
Confrontation Clause apply to the . . . underlying technical statements
written by (or otherwise made by) laboratory technicians” in crime lab
reports?75 He stated plainly that the “question [is] difficult, important, and
not squarely addressed either today or in our earlier opinions” but it is
answerable with further argument and briefing.76 Because there was no reargument, Justice Breyer combined the reasoning in the dissenting opinions
in Melendez–Diaz and Bullcoming, together with the reasoning of the
plurality in Williams.77 Justice Breyer eventually questioned what this
precedent would mean for a case in which the autopsy performer dies
before a murder trial, reviving Justice Kennedy’s question from the
Melendez–Diaz dissent: “Is the Confrontation Clause ‘effectively’ to
function ‘as a statute of limitations for murder?’”78 Under this precedent,
Justice Breyer worried it very well might.79

70

Id. at 2235.
Id. at 2243–44.
72
132 S. Ct. at 2244–55 (Breyer, J., concurring).
73
Id. at 2255–64 (Thomas, J., concurring). Justice Thomas concurred only in the
judgment, using his previously-defended (but never embraced by any other justice) analysis
concentrating on the lack of “formality and solemnity” in the outside laboratory’s
statements. Agreeing with the dissent’s view of the flaws in the plurality’s analysis, Justice
Thomas asserted that the statements were in fact hearsay used for their truth, but their lack of
strict formality (such as would be present with affidavits) meant they were not testimonial.
Id. at 2255–60.
74
Id. at 2264–77 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
75
Id. at 2244 (Breyer, J., concurring).
76
Id. at 2245.
77
Id.
78
Id. at 2251 (internal citations omitted).
79
Id. (“Such a precedent could bar the admission of other reliable case-specific
71
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Justice Kagan authored the dissent, joined by Justices Scalia,
Ginsberg, and Sotomayor.80 She focused on the desperate need for crossexamination of those who perform laboratory tests as a check on human
error.81 This dissent viewed Williams as “open-and-shut” pursuant to “our
Confrontation Clause precedents” because the prosecution introduced the
results of a laboratory test through a witness with no personal knowledge of
how it was generated.82 Significantly, Justice Kagan referred to Justice
Alito’s opinion as “‘the plurality’ because that is the conventional term for
it. But in all except its disposition, his opinion is a dissent: Five Justices
specifically reject every aspect of its reasoning and every paragraph of its
explication.”83
It seems from the discussion above that the justices each had their own
personal opinions on the way the issue should be decided, and those
opinions did not often overlap. Furthermore, two justices predicted the
confusion lower courts would experience when trying to apply what little
guidance was provided to them by the Court.84 It is no surprise, then, that
states and federal circuits alike have had difficulty addressing the issue of
forensic reports in their own courtrooms.
B. WHAT THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURTS HEARD

The federal circuit courts have interpreted Crawford and its progeny in
various ways. The following is by no means an exhaustive list of problems
within the circuits regarding testimonial hearsay; the next few cases are
examples of the different ways circuits have applied the Supreme Court’s
unclear and fractured precedent.
In 2008, the First Circuit held in United States v. De La Cruz85 that
autopsy reports are “in the nature of a business record, and business records
are expressly excluded from the reach of Crawford.”86 The court in De La
technical information such as, say, autopsy reports. . . . What is to happen if the medical
examiner dies before trial?”).
80
Id. at 2264 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
81
Id. (providing an example of a California case in which a lab technician testified that
the DNA sample she analyzed matched the defendant, only to re-take the stand later and
admit that she had accidentally switched the samples; the sample labeled with the
defendant’s name had actually come from the victim, and vice versa. This error was only
uncovered after confrontation on cross-examination.).
82
Id. at 2265.
83
Id.
84
Melendez–Diaz, 557 U.S. 305, 335 (2009) (Kennedy, J., dissenting); Williams, 132 S.
Ct. at 2245 (Breyer, J., concurring).
85
514 F.3d 121 (1st Cir. 2008).
86
Id. at 133.
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Cruz rejected defendant’s argument on the merits because
[a]n autopsy report is made in the ordinary course of business by a medical examiner
who is required by law to memorialize what he or she saw and did during an autopsy.
An autopsy report thus involves, in principal part, a careful and contemporaneous
reporting of a series of steps taken and facts found by a medical examiner during an
87
autopsy.

With that simple recognition of a well-known hearsay exception, the court
disposed of the issue.
However, when the First Circuit revisited the issue four years later in
Nardi v. Pepe,88 instead of citing to its own precedent and dismissing the
case, the court emphasized its confusion over the state of the law.89 Nardi
concerned a murder trial in which the state offered into evidence the
victim’s autopsy report.90 The only problem was that the original medical
examiner had retired to Florida and was unavailable to travel to the trial in
Massachusetts due to a medical condition.91 The state entered this evidence
through a classic surrogate—a highly experienced medical examiner with
no personal knowledge of the autopsy itself, but who had familiarized
himself with the autopsy report, as well as photographs of the body, and
drew his own independent conclusion from the materials.92 He arrived at the
same conclusion as the original medical examiner.93 However, he also
testified to the original medical examiner’s conclusion contained within the
autopsy report, as well as the veracity of several facts also contained therein
(of which he had no personal knowledge),94 which muddles the issue. The
First Circuit found this testimony perfectly admissible—but did so based
upon the “present uncertainty of the law,” the fact that it was “even more
unsettled at the time of Crawford,” just how far Crawford’s ruling would
extend, and that it was “certainly . . . not clearly established law at the time”
the case was tried.95 Unlike the confidence the court exuded in De La Cruz
in 2008, by 2011, the First Circuit was begging for greater guidance on this
issue.
The Second Circuit, however, had no trouble concluding that autopsy
87

Id.
662 F.3d 107 (1st Cir. 2011).
89
Id. at 112. Note that, unlike De La Cruz, Nardi was heard after the Davis opinion was
handed down in 2006.
90
Id. at 109.
91
Id.
92
Id.
93
Id.
94
Nardi, 662 F.3d 107 at 109.
95
Id. at 112.
88
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reports are categorically not testimonial, in United States v. Feliz.96 The
Feliz opinion clearly states that hearsay properly admitted under the
business record or public record exception to the hearsay rule cannot be
testimonial, even in light of Crawford.97 One basis for that conclusion lies
with the Crawford concurrence, in which Chief Justice Rehnquist “praised
what he considered to be Crawford’s per se exclusion of business records
from the definition of testimonial.”98 Interestingly, the court found that
autopsy reports can still be nontestimonial as long as they are properly
entered through the business or public records hearsay exception, even
when the report maker is aware that her report may be used at a future
trial.99 Recall that statements made for the purpose of being used at future
trial runs afoul of Davis.100 In addition, traditionally speaking, business and
public records must be kept in the regular course of business (as opposed to
being prepared with an eye toward trial) in order to meet those
exceptions.101
In contrast, the Eleventh and D.C. Circuits have found autopsy reports
testimonial pursuant to each precedent set forth in Crawford, Melendez–
Diaz, and Bullcoming.102 Although other circuits have encountered the
issue, none have confronted it as deeply as the aforementioned.103

96

467 F.3d 227, 233–34 (2d Cir. 2006).
Id. (holding that hearsay admitted pursuant to the business records exception is not
testimonial); Id. at 237 (holding that hearsay admitted pursuant to the public record
exception is not testimonial).
98
Feliz, 467 F.3d at 236; Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 76 (2004) (Rehnquist,
C.J., concurring). Note that this is particularly puzzling because Davis made clear that
statements made with an eye toward trial are by definition testimonial. Davis v. Washington,
547 U.S. 813, 826 (2006).
99
Id.; see also Vega v. Walsh, 669 F.3d 123, 127 (2d Cir. 2012) (holding that a
surrogate could testify to an autopsy report created by another, without admitting the autopsy
report itself into evidence); United States v. James, 712 F.3d 79, 99 (2d Cir. 2013) cert.
denied, 134 S. Ct. 2660 (2014) (finding no error in admitting an autopsy report into evidence
even though the report author did not testify at trial, and even though a surrogate testified in
trial to its contents, because the autopsy was completed far in advance to the start of the
criminal investigation of the defendant).
100
Davis, 547 U.S. at 822.
101
See, e.g., Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109, 114 (1943).
102
See, e.g., United States v. Ignasiak, 667 F.3d 1217, 1231 (11th Cir. 2012) (“Applying
the reasoning of Crawford, Melendez–Diaz, and Bullcoming, we conclude that the five
autopsy reports admitted into evidence . . . violated the Confrontation Clause”); United
States v. Moore, 651 F.3d 30, 73 (D.C. Cir. 2011) aff’d in part sub nom (finding autopsy
reports testimonial because the Court determined the circumstances were sufficiently
analogous Bullcoming, even though there were some differences).
103
The Sixth Circuit held that autopsy reports may fall under the nontestimonial,
business records exception. Mitchell v. Kelly, 520 F. App’x 329, 331 (6th Cir. 2013) (per
97

4. AMATO

2017]

4/21/2017 3:02 PM

ARE AUTOPSY REPORTS TESTIMONIAL?

307

C. WHAT THE STATES HEARD

The following is not meant to be an exhaustive list, but merely a
representative sampling of notable cases in which certain state courts have
struggled with the testimonial nature of forensic documents at trial.104
Massachusetts,105 Michigan,106 Missouri,107 New Mexico,108
Oklahoma,109 North Carolina,110 New Jersey,111 and West Virginia112 have
all held autopsy reports to be testimonial. Interestingly, the lower courts in
Michigan first ruled that the autopsy report in People v. Lewis113 was
nontestimonial because it was not prepared in anticipation of a trial.114
However, when the decision was affirmed a year later by the Michigan
curiam). The Ninth Circuit has also allowed portions of autopsy reports into evidence
without finding a violation of either Crawford or Davis, even when the autopsy was attended
by law enforcement. McNeiece v. Lattimore, 501 F. App’x 634, 636 (9th Cir. 2012).
104
For a much more in-depth examination of the following cases, see Marc D. Ginsberg,
The Confrontation Clause and Forensic Autopsy Reports—A “Testimonial” 74 LA. L. REV.
117, 148–63 (2013–2014).
105
Commonwealth v. Avila, 912 N.E.2d 1014, 1029 (Mass. 2009) (finding a surrogate’s
testimony inadmissible where he based his expert opinion on the autopsy report, the report
was not admitted into evidence, but a diagram from the report was); Commonwealth v.
Reavis, 992 N.E.2d 304, 312 (Mass. 2013) (“Substitute medical examiner may not, however,
testify to facts in the underlying autopsy report where that report has not been admitted.”).
106
People v. Lewis, 788 N.W.2d 461, 466–67 (Mich. Ct. App. 2010), aff’d in judgment,
vacated in part by People v. Lewis, 806 N.W.2d 295, 295 (Mich. 2011) (holding initially
that the autopsy report was nontestimonial, but vacating that portion of the opinion one year
later).
107
State v. Davidson, 242 S.W.3d 409, 417 (Mo. Ct. App. 2007) (holding the
surrogate’s testimony inadmissible when the autopsy report was prepared at the request of
law enforcement and admitted into evidence at trial).
108
See, e.g., State v. Jaramillo, 272 P.3d 682, 686 (N.M. Ct. App. 2011) (finding the
autopsy report testimonial when it was prepared in anticipation of litigation and conducted in
a manner requiring judgment and analysis); State v. Navarette, 294 P.3d 435, 438 (N.M.
2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 64 (2013) (holding that “there is no meaningful distinction
between factual observations and conclusions requiring skill and judgment,” as stated in
Jaramillo).
109
Cuesta-Rodriguez v. State, 241 P.3d 214, 229 (Okla. Crim. App. 2010) (finding an
autopsy report testimonial when applying the Melendez–Diaz precedent).
110
State v. Locklear, 681 S.E.2d 293, 304–05 (N.C. 2009) (finding an autopsy report
testimonial when applying the Melendez–Diaz precedent).
111
State v. Bass, No. 07-12-2903, 2013 WL 1798956, at *20 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
Apr. 30, 2013) (per curiam) (State v. Bass, 224 N.J. 285, 316, 132 A.3d 1207, 1225 (2016))
(holding the autopsy report in question testimonial, using the “primary purpose” test).
112
State v. Kennedy, 735 S.E.2d 905, 917 (W. Va. 2012) (“[F]or purposes of use in
criminal prosecutions, autopsy reports are under all circumstances testimonial.”).
113
788 N.W.2d 461 (Mich. Ct. App. 2010), aff’d in judgment, vacated in part by People
v. Lewis, 806 N.W.2d 295 (Mich. 2011).
114
Lewis, 788 N.W.2d at 466–67.
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Supreme Court, it issued an order vacating that particular part of the
opinion.115 Together, the Lewis cases are one example of the internal
confusion caused by the U.S. Supreme Court’s precedent, let alone the
confusion present between states.
In contrast to the states listed above, Arizona,116 California,117
Florida,118 Illinois,119 Louisiana,120 Ohio,121 and South Carolina122 have held
that autopsy reports are not testimonial. Most significant among these cases
is State v. Medina,123 a case recently denied certiorari by the U.S. Supreme
115

Lewis, 806 N.W.2d at 295.
State v. Medina, 306 P.3d 48, 62–64 (Ariz. 2013) (holding that an autopsy report did
not violate the Confrontation Clause, considering Melendez–Diaz and Williams).
117
People v. Dungo, 286 P.3d 442, 450 (Cal. 2012) (holding that an autopsy report was
nontestimonial for the purpose of the Confrontation Clause in part because of this particular
report’s lack of formality).
118
Banmah v. State, 87 So. 3d 101, 103 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012) (holding that
“autopsy reports are non-testimonial because they are prepared pursuant to a statutory duty,
and not solely for use in prosecution.”).
119
People v. Leach, 980 N.E.2d 570, 590 (Ill. 2012) (holding that “the autopsy report in
the present case was not testimonial because it was (1) not prepared for the primary purpose
of accusing a targeted individual or (2) for the primary purpose of providing evidence in a
criminal case”); People v. Brewer, 987 N.E.2d 938, 951 (Ill. App. Ct. 2013) (holding the
autopsy report in question nontestimonial because its primary purpose was to determine
cause of death but not who was responsible for causing the death, nothing in the document
linked the defendant to the crime, and, because the autopsy report was properly admitted into
evidence, “the expert witness’s testimony cannot have violated the confrontation clause even
if it had the effect of offering the report for the truth of the matters asserted therein.”); People
v. Cortez, 931 N.E.2d 751, 756 (Ill. App. Ct. 2010) (holding that the autopsy report in
question was nontestimonial because it was admitted through the business records hearsay
exception and, pursuant to Crawford, documents admitted under that exception are
nontestimonial).
120
State v. Russell, 966 So. 2d 154, 166 (La. Ct. App. 2007) (finding that a coroner’s
report was properly admitted, even when the testifying witness had not personally prepared
the report, because “[a] medical expert’s opinion is almost always based on some degree of
hearsay, given the fact that numerous other medical personnel and records may be involved
in the treatment of a patient” and therefore “[t]he issue is not one concerning admissibility,
but rather the weight a fact finder gives to this expert testimony, dependent upon the
professional’s qualifications and experience, and the facts upon which his opinion is
based.”).
121
State v. Craig, 853 N.E.2d 621, 638 (Ohio 2006) (holding that the admission of the
autopsy report did not violate the Confrontation Clause because the document had been
admitted under the public records hearsay exception, and it could have been admitted under
the business records exception).
122
State v. Cutro, 618 S.E.2d 890, 896 (S.C. 2005) (holding that an autopsy report
admitted under the business records hearsay exception does not violate the Confrontation
Clause).
123
State v. Medina, 306 P.3d 48 (Ariz. 2013) (case on direct appeal from a resentencing
trial).
116
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Court, where the issue on appeal was whether autopsy reports are
testimonial for the purpose of the Confrontation Clause.124
Maryland and New York have what has been called a “hybrid” policy
on this issue.125 Essentially, this means that those two states do not fall
neatly into either category jurisprudentially, but have opted for a middleground approach, in an effort to form a coherent policy.126 This middleground approach is characterized by regarding portions of an autopsy report
as testimonial while others are not; for example, redacting “testimonial”
conclusions from an autopsy report while admitting “nontestimonial”
factual accounts of the procedure.127 Despite the existence of hybrid policies
at the state level, federal courts remain split between the two traditional
camps.
II. PREDICTIONS & SOLUTIONS
A. THE SUPREME COURT MAY FIND AUTOPSY REPORTS TESTIMONIAL

As discussed above, the U.S. Supreme Court has not provided clear
guidance on how its recent Confrontation Clause jurisprudence can and
should apply to future cases. Furthermore, at least two of the justices have
specifically identified autopsy reports as future problems for Crawford and
its progeny.128 This Comment argues that the Supreme Court may find
autopsy reports testimonial when it eventually hears a case on the issue.
First, due to the immense confusion and ongoing turmoil in the lower courts
surrounding the testimonial status of forensic hearsay, the Court should take
up the issue at some point. Second, when it does, it is possible that the
Court will rule that autopsy reports are testimonial. It will then become
necessary to deal with the problem of categorically testimonial autopsy
reports, which can be done with help from the medical community.

124

Id. at 62–65 (holding that the victim’s autopsy report was not testimonial for the
purposes of the Confrontation Clause), cert. denied, Medina v. Arizona, 134 S. Ct. 1309
(2014).
125
See, e.g., Rollins v. State, 161 Md. App. 34, 82 (2006); People v. Hall, 923 N.Y.S.2d
428, 432 (N.Y. App. Div. 2011) (citing People v. Freycinet, 892 N.E.2d 38, 41 (N.Y. 2008)).
For a more in-depth discussion of the hybrid approach, see Ginsberg, supra note 104, at
163–65.
126
Id.
127
See, e.g., Rollins, 161 Md. App. at 82; Hall, 923 N.Y.S.2d at 432 (citing Freycinet,
892 N.E.2d at 42).
128
Melendez–Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 337 (2009) (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting); Williams v. Illinois, 132 S. Ct. 2221, 2251 (2012) (Breyer, J., concurring).
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1. Why The Supreme Court Will Likely Hear the Issue
First, as examined above, the sheer amount of confusion and split
opinions between circuit and state courts suggests that it would be
inappropriate for the Court to ignore the testimonial status of autopsies
indefinitely. Even though the Court recently declined to hear Medina v.
Arizona,129 which presented an opportunity to resolve this exact question,
perpetually burying its head in the sand will only cause continued
uncertainty and disparate outcomes among lower courts.130 It is important to
note that these contradictions are avoidable—it is not as if they are
disagreeing on an area of the law for which states could exercise their
individual discretion. The issue is whether the admission of a certain type of
document violates a criminal defendant’s constitutional rights if testified to
by someone other than its declarant. Unlike many areas of the law, this is a
question that can have a settled, definitive answer—one that should apply to
every criminal defendant throughout the country. Furthermore, given the
paramount importance of a defendant’s rights in the criminal justice system,
this question deserves a straight answer.
2. Autopsy Reports May Be Found Testimonial
If the U.S. Supreme Court hears the issue, it may determine autopsy
reports are testimonial. This prediction is supported by looking at each
justice’s concerns in prior seminal cases. With the exception of Chief
Justice Roberts, every single justice currently on the Court has written an
opinion expressing their view on the testimonial status of forensic hearsay.
The following examination of these overarching case concerns and
individual opinions sheds more light on the question of whether the Court
will find that autopsy reports are “testimonial.”
i. Justices Ginsberg, Kagan, and Sotomayor
It is highly likely that Justices Ginsberg, Kagan, and Sotomayor would
find autopsies testimonial for the purposes of the Confrontation Clause.
Justice Ginsberg agreed with the majority opinion in Melendez–Diaz, which
held that the laboratory certificates in question were testimonial because
they were essentially identical to affidavits, which are categorically
testimonial.131 The certificates functioned to “provid[e] testimony against
petitioner, proving one fact necessary for his conviction—that the substance

129
130
131

134 S. Ct. 1309, 1309 (2014) cert. denied.
See supra notes 85–127 and accompanying text.
557 U.S. at 310.
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he possessed was cocaine.”132 Autopsy reports function in much the same
way, providing the conclusions of the declarant in a testimonial manner. For
example, autopsies are typically performed to determine an individual’s
cause of death.133 An autopsy concluding that an individual’s cause of death
was homicide (as opposed to an accident) could “prov[e] one fact necessary
for his conviction.”134 Justice Ginsberg authored the majority opinion in
Bullcoming, which held that an analyst who performs a forensic test must
be brought into court personally to testify.135 In that opinion, Justice
Ginsberg explained that the Confrontation Clause does not permit the
prosecution “to introduce a forensic laboratory report containing a
testimonial certification—made for the purpose of proving a particular
fact—through the in-court testimony of a scientist who did not sign the
certification or perform or observe the test reported in the certification.”136
Finally, Justice Ginsberg joined the dissent in Williams, which argued the
paramount importance of a defendant’s ability to cross-examine the
individual making testimonial statements about him.137 The dissent argues
that without this check on human error, unreliable forensic reports would be
admitted into the record and presumed as true.138 This concern can arguably
also apply to autopsy reports.
Justice Kagan substantially joined Justice Ginsberg’s majority opinion
in Bullcoming and authored the dissent in Williams. This indicated that
Justice Kagan may share Justice Ginsberg’s concerns about what role
forensic documents serve in a criminal conviction. She also voiced her own
concerns about admitting a document of that nature into evidence without
giving a defendant the opportunity to cross-examine its creator.139 Justice
Kagan’s dissent in Williams concentrated on this need for crossexamination.140 Because of the ubiquity of television shows like CSI and
Law & Order, which make frequent on-screen use of crime scene
technicians and autopsies, the average person likely has some idea of what
an autopsy entails.141 However, these shows can have the adverse effect of

132

Id. at 313.
HANDBOOK OF AUTOPSY PRACTICE 113 (Brenda L. Waters ed. 2009).
134
Melendez–Diaz, 557 U.S. at 313.
135
564 U.S. 647, 661 (2011).
136
Id. at 652.
137
132 S. Ct. 2221, 2264 (2012) (Kagan, J., dissenting).
138
Id.
139
Id. at 2264–65.
140
Id.
141
See N.J. Schweitzer & Michael J. Saks, The CSI Effect: Popular Fiction About
Forensic Science Affects the Public’s Expectations About Real Forensic Science, 47
133
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biasing lay jurors in criminal cases toward automatically placing forensic
evidence on a pedestal, believing scientific tests reliable by default without
considering the potential for human error.142 What the average juror might
not know is that more than one in five physicians working in the country’s
busiest morgues is not board certified in forensic pathology, although
experts say such certification is necessary to ensure that doctors who
perform autopsies have at least basic skills.143 That is, of course, when a
medical doctor actually performs the autopsy—currently, eleven states
operate under a coroner system, which means that an elected or appointed
official with no required medical training is often in charge of overseeing
autopsies.144 In 2007, an eighteen-year-old became Indiana’s youngest
deputy coroner.145
For states that still use the coroner system, or a hybrid of the coroner
and medical examiner systems,146 coroners can choose to refer autopsies to
JURIMETRICS 357–64 (2007). See generally Hon. Donald E. Shelton et al., An Indirect-Effects
Model of Mediated Adjudication: The CSI Myth, the Tech Effect, and Metropolitan Jurors’
Expectations for Scientific Evidence, 12 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 1 (2009).
142
Schweitzer & Saks, supra note 141. See generally Shelton, et al., supra note 141.
143
Post Mortem: The Story So Far, PROPUBLICA (Aug. 16, 2011, 12:24 PM),
https://www.propublica.org/article/post-mortem-the-story-so-far.
144
The position of coroner differs slightly from jurisdiction to jurisdiction from how
they are chosen to what their qualifications are.
Coroners are constitutional officers, with 82 percent being elected and 18 percent appointed.
Coroners as elected officials fulfill requirements for residency, minimum age, and any other
qualifications required by statute. They may or may not be physicians, may or may not have
medical training, and may or may not perform autopsies. . . . Some serve as administrators of
death investigation systems, while others are responsible solely for decisions regarding the cause
and manner of death. Typical qualifications for election as a coroner include being a registered
voter, attaining a minimum age requirement ranging from 18 to 25 years, being free of felony
convictions, and completing a training program, which can be of varying length. The selection
pool is local and small (because work is inconvenient and pay is relatively low), and medical
training is not always a requirement. Coroners are independent of law enforcement and other
agencies, but as elected officials they must be responsive to the public, and this may lead to
difficulty in making unpopular determinations of the cause and manner of death.

NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE UNITED STATES: A
PATH FORWARD 247 (2009).
145
Id.; see also Associated Press, Teen Becomes Indiana’s Youngest Coroner, NEWS
OKAY (May 12, 2007 12:00 AM), http://newsok.com/article/3053301.
146
See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 144, at 248–49.
In contrast [to coroners], medical examiners are almost always physicians, are appointed, and are
often pathologists or forensic pathologists. . . . In statewide systems, cities and counties have
local medical examiners that are physicians trained to receive the reports of death, decide
jurisdiction, examine the body, and make a determination of the cause and manner of death.
They certify locally many obvious natural and accidental deaths. In statewide and regionalized
statewide systems, local medical examiners do not need to be forensic pathologists and do not
perform autopsies, but they do refer, according to protocols, deaths from violence—particularly
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forensic pathologists, but there is no oversight of this process.147 There is
also no system to assure that the coroner’s certification of an individual’s
legal cause and manner of death is consistent with that forensic
pathologist’s conclusions.148 Furthermore, the facilities for conducting
autopsies vary greatly in quality between jurisdictions.149 Compounding the
problem, there is no national standard for certifying or educating autopsy
performers.150 Aside from facility quality and administrative oversight of
the process, experts agree that the individual competence of the death
investigator—be it a coroner, medical examiner, forensic pathologist, etc.—
is the key factor to maintaining the integrity of expert testimony in criminal
and civil cases.151
Justice Kagan is likely aware of at least some of the procedural and
competency issues surrounding forensic investigators, as evidenced by her
reference to a crucial laboratory mistake that was only discovered upon
cross-examination of the forensic specialist who performed the test.152 It is
for these reasons, as well as the unreliability surrounding autopsy reports,
that Justice Kagan will most likely find autopsy reports testimonial.
Justice Sotomayor is also likely to find autopsy reports testimonial. In
addition to joining Justice Kagan’s dissent in Williams, Justice Sotomayor
authored a concurrence in Bullcoming that sheds light on her particular
views.153 In her concurrence, Justice Sotomayor affirms the majority’s
decision to bar the admission of the forensic reports, but does so based on

suicides, homicides, and deaths occurring under suspicious circumstances—to a central or
regional autopsy facility for autopsy and further follow-up by a forensic pathologist. In hybrid or
mixed state systems, coroners may refer cases for autopsy to forensic pathologists, but there is no
supervision or quality assurance to ensure that the coroner’s certification of the cause of death
and manner of death is concordant with the pathologist’s conclusions.

Id.
147
148
149

See id. at 249.
Id.
Id. at 250.

Only one-third of offices have in-house facilities to perform the histology needed to make
microscopic diagnoses on tissues sampled at autopsy. Only one-third have in-house toxicology
capabilities to identify drugs present in the deceased that either contributed to or were the
primary cause of death. One-third do not have radiology services in-house that would allow the
identification of missiles, disease, bony injury or identification features in decedents. Some
coroner systems do not have any physical facility at all.

Id.
150
151
152
153

Id. at 250–51.
Id. at 250.
Williams v. Illinois, 132 S. Ct. 2221, 2264 (2012) (Kagan, J., dissenting).
Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 564 U.S. 647, 668 (2011) (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
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reasoning from Davis.154 She emphasizes that the primary purpose of the
reports at issue was to create “an out-of-court substitute for trial
testimony . . . which renders it testimonial.”155 Although the report in
Bullcoming was made in the course of a police investigation for drunk
driving, Justice Sotomayor categorizes the documents as testimonial.156
This is significant in the context of autopsy reports because they are
certainly not made with the “primary purpose” of aiding an ongoing
emergency; they are far more like statements made for an “evidentiary
purpose” like the reports that troubled Justice Sotomayor.157
ii. Justice Thomas
Justice Thomas has remained consistent throughout his Confrontation
Clause jurisprudence, routinely coming back to his position that the key to
testimonial status is sufficient solemnity.158 As far back as Melendez–Diaz,
Justice Thomas has insisted that the Confrontation Clause is only
implicated in “formalized testimonial materials, such as affidavits.”159 For
Justice Thomas, such materials have included the laboratory certificates in
Melendez–Diaz160 and the blood alcohol tests in Bullcoming,161 but not the
DNA profile in Williams.162 To Justice Thomas, the DNA profile in
Williams did not violate the Confrontation Clause because “it is neither a
sworn nor a certified declaration of fact. Nowhere does the report attest that
its statements accurately reflect the DNA testing processes used or the
results obtained.”163 Justice Thomas noted that the reports in Melendez–
Diaz were notarized and that the reports in Bullcoming included a
“Certificate of Analyst,” while the report in Williams had neither, nor
anything comparable.164
Although it may be possible to predict Justice Thomas’s likely analysis

154
Id. (citing Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 822 (2006) which established the
“primary purpose” test for evaluating such statements).
155
Id. at 671–72 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
156
Id. at 672.
157
Id.
158
See, e.g., Williams v. Illinois, 132 S. Ct. 2221, 2255–60 (2012) (Thomas, J.,
concurring).
159
Melendez–Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 329 (2009) (Thomas, J., concurring)
(citing White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 365 (1992)).
160
Id.
161
Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 564 U.S. 647, 665 (2011).
162
Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2255–60 (Thomas, J., concurring).
163
Id. at 2260.
164
Id.
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of whether autopsy reports are testimonial, it is difficult to predict his
ultimate decision. This is because his final decision is likely to depend on
the autopsy report in the given case. As previously addressed, the quality
and “formality” of autopsy reports vary widely by jurisdiction.165 If a case
dealt with a sufficiently formalized autopsy report, Justice Thomas would
be likely to find it testimonial. However, if the autopsy report was not
certified or attested in a formal manner, Justice Thomas would probably
come to the opposite conclusion. In this respect, Justice Thomas is
somewhat of a wild card. However, assuming that recommended
procedures are followed, autopsy reports are more likely than not
sufficiently formalized for Justice Thomas.166
iii. Justices Kennedy, Breyer, and Alito
Justices Kennedy, Breyer, and Alito tend to vote together regarding
testimonial questions. All three justices were part of the majority in Davis167
as well as the dissents in Melendez–Diaz168 and Bullcoming.169 They only
diverged in one instance: when Justices Kennedy and Alito joined the
plurality in Williams while Justice Breyer chose to author his own
concurrence.
Justice Kennedy’s dissent in Melendez–Diaz was primarily concerned
with the unclear precedent set by the majority, as well as the future concern
for how the rule excluding a forensic document as testimonial might apply
to other kinds of forensic hearsay, such as autopsy reports.170 Justice Breyer
revived Justice Kennedy’s concern in the Williams concurrence, when he
cited to Justice Kennedy’s Melendez–Diaz dissent: “Is the Confrontation
Clause effectively to function as a statute of limitations for murder?”171

165

See supra notes 143–151 and accompanying text.
See HANDBOOK OF AUTOPSY PRACTICE, supra note 133, at 6 (encouraging colleagues
to look over the report before final signatures are made in an attempt to catch any errors
before the document is completed). Justice Thomas has stated that a document’s testimonial
nature turns on whether that document is sufficiently “formalized”; that is to say, the
document has been signed under penalty of perjury, notarized, or was written with sufficient
“solemnity” showing that the author or signatory was careful and serious with the
document’s preparation. See, e.g., Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2255–60 (Thomas, J., concurring).
Therefore, for Justice Thomas, the more formal a document is, the more likely is it to be
testimonial.
167
Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 815 (2006).
168
Melendez–Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 330 (2009) (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting).
169
Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 564 U.S. 647, 674 (2011) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
170
557 U.S. at 335 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
171
Williams v. Illinois, 132 S. Ct. 2221, 2251 (2012) (plurality opinion).
166

4. AMATO

316

4/21/2017 3:02 PM

AMATO

[Vol. 107

Both justices substantially agree on the testimonial status of forensic
hearsay, and even share the same fear regarding the potential result of this
precedent’s application to autopsy reports. Although Justice Alito has not
authored an opinion raising this question himself, he joined Justice
Kennedy’s dissent where the inquiry into whether deeming autopsy reports
testimonial could function as a statute of limitations on murder originated.
However, as significant as that reservation may be, cases die all the time
with their key witnesses.172 It is not uncommon for the death or
unavailability of an important witness to handicap the prosecution, even in
the case of serious crimes like murder.173 Although this policy concern has
been brought up by multiple judges at different stages of Confrontation
Clause jurisprudence, it is unlikely that will be the deciding factor that
makes autopsy reports nontestimonial, especially in light of the policy
concerns expressed by Justices Ginsberg, Kagan, and Sotomayor.174
The plurality in Williams, authored by Justice Alito and joined by
Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Kennedy, is significant in a few respects.
First, Williams emphasized that the testimonial question only applies to
statements being admitted for their truth.175 The Federal Rules of Evidence
permit expert witnesses to testify to the facts underlying their conclusions,
even if those underlying facts are inadmissible (such as hearsay), for a
narrow purpose: giving the jury context for the overall testimony, so that
they can assign appropriate weight to the expert’s opinion.176 In other

172

See, e.g., Veronica Rocha, U.S. Prosecutors Drop Case in Massive Yosemite Fire
After Witnesses Die, L.A. TIMES (May 1, 2015, 11:46 AM), http://www.latimes.com/local/la
now/la-me-ln-dismiss-indictment-rim-fire-20150501-story.html; Unavailable Witness Leads
to Dropping Charges Against Brothers, CHICAGO TRIBUNE (Mar. 13, 2015, 3:17 PM), http://
www.chicagotribune.com/suburbs/post-tribune/news/ct-ptb-case-dismissed-st-0316-201503
13-story.html; Prosecutor: “I Don’t Have a Choice,” WANE.COM (May 4, 2015, 10:49 AM),
http://wane.com/2015/05/04/charges-to-be-dropped-for-man-accused-of-murder/.
173
Id.
174
For example, the concern that all evidence against a defendant should be tested by
the crucible of cross-examination. See, e.g., Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2264 (Kagan, J.,
dissenting) (emphasizing the importance of a defendant’s ability to cross-examine statements
made against him); Id. at 2264 (emphasizing the importance of cross-examination in
uncovering potential procedural errors in forensic tests).
175
Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2228 (plurality opinion).
176
FED. R. EVID. 703.
An expert may base an opinion on facts or data in the case that the expert has been made aware
of or personally observed. If experts in the particular field would reasonably rely on those kinds
of facts or data in forming an opinion on the subject, they need not be admissible for the opinion
to be admitted. But if the facts or data would otherwise be inadmissible, the proponent of the
opinion may disclose them to the jury only if their probative value in helping the jury evaluate
the opinion substantially outweighs their prejudicial effect.
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words, in certain situations the jury needs to hear the basis for the expert’s
opinion, even if that basis consists of inadmissible hearsay, in order to
judge the fairness or reliability of the conclusion the expert has drawn.
However, the jury is not permitted to accept those underlying facts as true
based solely upon the expert’s testimony—the purpose of hearing those
facts is limited to assigning weight alone.177 In Williams, Justice Alito
emphasized that there is no testimonial concern with experts testifying as
such because those inadmissible facts are only getting to the jury for that
limited purpose.178 Although the argument could be made that a surrogate
who testifies about the outcome of an autopsy is necessarily testifying to the
accuracy of what was conducted and what resulted (without having personal
knowledge of either), the Williams opinion seems to suggest that so long as
the proponent of the evidence is using the allowances carved out for expert
opinions, the testimony of the surrogate may be admitted. However, it
should be noted that autopsies are unlike the forensic hearsay that was the
subject of Williams in that autopsies contain an opinion component whereas
the hearsay in Williams was a DNA report with no opinion component.179 It
is possible that this distinction, which formed the basis of the Williams
plurality, may further lead Justices Alito, Breyer, and Kennedy to find
autopsy reports testimonial—after all, if one subscribes to this view, that the
underlying data from the autopsy report can be admitted for this limited
purpose and a surrogate can be crossed-examined on the conclusions she
draws from those facts, what is the actual danger in declaring autopsy
reports testimonial? Furthermore, even if these justices were to find autopsy
reports nontestimonial, the three together would not be enough to form a
majority.180
iv. Chief Justice Roberts
Unlike the other justices, Chief Justice Roberts has not authored his
own opinion on this issue. However, it is worth noting that as chief justice,
if he is in the majority or plurality, Chief Justice Roberts assigns who is to
author the majority or plurality opinion.181 Without an authored opinion, the
only clue as to where Chief Justice Roberts might come down on the issue
Id.
177

Id.
Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2228 (plurality opinion).
179
Id. at 2244. The “opinion” of the expert in that case was whether the facts contained
in the DNA report matched the facts contained in another report. Id.
180
See infra Part IV.
181
Paul J. Wahlbeck, Strategy and Constraints on Supreme Court Opinion Assignment,
154 U. PA. L. REV. 1729, 1729–30 (2006).
178
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is his selection of Justice Alito to author the plurality opinion in Williams.
This might provide insight as to what reasoning and outcome Chief Justice
Roberts finds persuasive, namely Justice Alito’s particular point of view.
However, Chief Justice Roberts has not said or done anything to confirm
that interpretation; he may just have preferred Justice Alito’s reasoning and
outcome on the particular facts of Williams. Alternatively, he may have
selected Justice Alito as the author to preserve a fragile coalition of justices
who would author a less problematic opinion or outcome. Unfortunately,
without an opinion directly authored by Chief Justice Roberts, there is
nothing concrete on which to base a predication of his likely opinion on the
issue.
v. The Empty Chair, Now Filled
Of course, the elephant in the room is the recent Supreme Court
vacancy. This opening injected greater uncertainty into this issue because of
Justice Scalia’s active participation in the Court’s foundational opinions—
he authored the majority in Crawford, Davis, and Melendez–Diaz.
Furthermore, as the most senior justice in the majority for Bullcoming, he
was responsible for choosing Justice Ginsberg to author the majority
opinion.182 Without Justice Scalia’s voice in this debate, for better or worse,
the Court is missing much of its previous guidance on the issue.
The confirmation of Justice Neil Gorsuch does not provide much
insight into this issue. In his tenure as a circuit court judge, Justice Gorsuch
only issued four, unreported opinions dealing with the Confrontation
Clause,183 only one of which concerned the testimonial nature of certain
hearsay statements, and even then, it was a tangential issue in the case.184
Thus, making any prediction about his approach to the issue as a justice is,
for the moment, difficult.
There is reason to believe that the Court may find autopsy reports
182

See supra note 181. Note that, when the chief justice is not part of the majority or
plurality, the most senior justice in the majority or plurality is responsible for assigning the
author of the main opinion. Id. at 1731.
183
United States v. Leyva, 442 F. App’x 376 (10th Cir. 2011); United States v. Pursley,
550 F. App’x 575 (10th Cir. 2013); Winbush v. Faulk, 510 F. App’x 746 (10th Cir. 2013);
Sanders v. Miller, 555 F. App’x 750 (10th Cir. 2014).
184
Leyva, 442 F. App’x at 382 n. 2 (“To mount a successful Confrontation Clause
challenge, [the defendant] would have to show (among other things) both that any out of
court statements relied upon by Officer Coleman were testimonial, and that he merely
‘parrot[ed]’ that testimonial hearsay instead of using such statements to inform his own
independent opinion. On this record, neither of those conclusions would be at all plain. In
any event, and for the reasons we’ve already given, we believe that any such error would be
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.”) (internal citations omitted).
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testimonial, as evident by examining of each justice’s rationales in past
analogous cases. Although it is not possible to predict for every variable
that might arise, based on the known concerns of each justice, it is a likely
outcome. This presents a problem, though, for those prosecutors that rely on
autopsy reports to make their case. What would happen to criminal trials if
autopsy reports were barred from evidence unless the report preparer was
able to testify to its contents?
B. AN INTERDISCIPLINARY SOLUTION

Finding autopsy reports testimonial would pose a huge problem for
prosecutors—namely barring the admission of an autopsy report where its
creator is unavailable for trial. Although several possible solutions exist, an
interdisciplinary solution might be most effective. Considering the
problems posed by these documents in the legal community, the medical
community should embrace the testimonial status of these documents and
use common sense understanding to everyone’s advantage.
One of the determining factors to whether something is testimonial lies
in the statement’s “primary purpose,” namely whether it was made for the
purpose of producing evidence against a defendant in a criminal trial, or
whether it had some non-litigation purpose.185 Autopsy conductors, if not
all forensic medical examiners,186 understand that their reports may be used
in a future criminal trial187; at the very least, a forensic pathologist who
performs an autopsy and determines the cause of death to be homicide
should well know that her conclusion may become evidence against the
perpetrator. It is also common for death investigators to perform autopsies
at the request of law enforcement, or to have their own suspicions at the
mere sight of a body (e.g., one riddled with bullet holes).188 Instead of
closing their eyes to the possibility that one’s work could be used at trial (as
one would have to do in order to argue that the report is nontestimonial),
185

Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 822 (2006).
For a discussion of the key differences between clinical autopsies and forensic
autopsies, see Andrew Higely, Tales of the Dead: Why Autopsy Reports Should Be Classified
as Testimonial Statements Under the Confrontation Clause, 48 NEW ENG. L. REV. 171, 175
(2013–2014).
187
HANDBOOK OF AUTOPSY PRACTICE, supra note 133, at 125.
186

In the broadest sense, a medicolegal autopsy is any autopsy that generates an evidentiary
document that forms a basis for opinions rendered in a criminal trial, deposition, wrongful death
civil suit, medical malpractice civil suit, administrative hearing, or workmen’s compensation
hearing. Because any autopsy report can become such a document, all autopsies should be
considered medicolegal.

Id. (emphasis added).
188
HANDBOOK OF AUTOPSY PRACTICE, supra note 133, at 137.
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death investigators should prepare for that outcome to occur.
As discussed above, there is an awareness within the medical
community and within the government that there needs to be greater
regulation of death investigators.189 This movement began around 2009.190
In conjunction with this movement, the legal community and the medical
community should collaborate on a re-drafting of the now-outdated Model
Post-Mortem Examinations Act of 1954 (Model Act).191 The National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws issued the Model
Act in 1954 as a model law.192 Like the Model Penal Code, states could
choose to adopt or incorporate the Model Act’s provisions as law, which a
number of states did.193 The Model Act’s stated purpose “is to provide a
means whereby greater competence can be assured in determining causes of
death where criminal liability may be involved.”194 The Model Act includes
a provision for “honorary commissions of disinterested persons” that would
govern an oversight body called the Post-Mortem Examination Office to
ensure that forensic death investigators were equipped with the appropriate
facilities and possessed the appropriate training to carry out their tasks.195
However, this Model Act is outdated—it was written in 1954 and has never
been updated to reflect scientific advances since that time.196 In fact, the
Science, Technology, and Law Policy and Global Affairs Committee jointly
with the Committee on Applied and Theoretical Statistics appealed to
Congress in 2009 to redraft the Model Act on those grounds.197
Furthermore, the National Institute of Standards and Technology, part of
the United States Department of Commerce, has more recently appealed for

189

See supra notes 144–151 and accompanying text.
NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 144, at 247.
191
Robert A. Leflar, Drafting the Model Post-Mortem Examinations Act, 41 A.B.A. J.
266, 266–68 (1955). See generally MODEL POST-MORTEM EXAMINATIONS ACT (PREFATORY
NOTE) (1954).
192
NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 144, at 242.
193
Id. at 243; Leflar, supra note 191; see, e.g., Ark. Code Ann. § 14-15-301-309 (West);
La. Civ. Code Ann. r.P. T. III, Refs & Annos; Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 38, § 2 (West).
194
Leflar, supra note 191, at 266.
195
MODEL POST-MORTEM EXAMINATIONS ACT, supra note 191.
196
NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 144, at 266; NAT’L INSTITUTE OF STANDARDS
AND TECH., RECOMMENDATION TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL: MODEL LEGISLATION FOR
MEDICOLEGAL DEATH INVESTIGATION SYSTEMS 1 (2016) (“The 1954 act is so obsolete that it
provides little guidance for either modern medical examiner or coroner legislation and needs
to be updated.”).
197
NAT’L INSTITUTE OF STANDARDS AND TECH., RECOMMENDATION TO THE ATTORNEY
GENERAL: MODEL LEGISLATION FOR MEDICOLEGAL DEATH INVESTIGATION SYSTEMS, supra
note 196.
190
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funding to redraft the model legislation.198 Such a redrafting should include
a provision suggesting or requiring that autopsies be undertaken with the
intent to perfectly preserve the process (with video, photographs, etc.) such
that another professional may review and obtain facts and data to support an
original, independent conclusion.
Performing the autopsy with the expectation of peer review serves
multiple purposes. First, it can act as a deterrent against producing a sloppy
work product. Second, it helps to ensure that all stages of the autopsy are
preserved so that a future surrogate may be able to come to his own
independent conclusion about information on which he can be crossexamined. Relying on images and video is far preferable to a cold paper
record. Not only will the surrogate have the opportunity to view the
underlying “facts” (e.g., condition of the body), but she will be able to
observe the manner in which the examination was performed, taking her
own understanding of the standards in the field into consideration when
opining on the quality of the autopsy, if necessary.199
This will not be an overly burdensome requirement. Most death
investigators already take pictures in accordance with autopsies, although
their purpose in doing so is not often principally to preserve the look of the
body for future review.200 Today, even the most basic cameras have high
image resolution, making it easier than ever to take high-quality pictures at
a low cost. Other imaging techniques have becoming increasingly common
in autopsies in recent years as well, including MRIs, CTs, and
ultrasonography.201
Undoubtedly, there is the question of the quality of the video or
photographs produced, just as there would be with videos or photographs
admitted into evidence (if they must actually be admitted) for any other
purpose in a criminal trial: Are they authentic? Do they fairly and
accurately depict what they purport to? However, these concerns can be
adequately addressed in the redrafting of a new model standard for post198

NAT’L INSTITUTE OF STANDARDS AND TECH., supra note 196, at 1–4.
There are other benefits to adopting this solution, such as giving juries the ability to
see more than just conclusory statements edited through the mouth of an individual who
cannot and will not be subject to cross-examination. This method was essentially accepted
by the First Circuit in Nardi v. Pepe, 662 F.3d 107, 112 (1st Cir. 2011).
200
Medical professionals are already accustomed to the standard of taking pictures at an
autopsy in anticipation that they will be viewed by others, such as for teaching purposes.
HANDBOOK OF AUTOPSY PRACTICE, supra note 133, at 6–7; see also NAT’L RESEARCH
COUNCIL, supra note 144, at 264.
201
HANDBOOK OF AUTOPSY PRACTICE, supra note 133, at 102–03; see also Ian S.D.
Roberts. et. al., Post-Mortem Imaging as an Alternative to Autopsy in the Diagnosis of Adult
Deaths: A Validation Study, 379 THE LANCET 136, 136 (2012).
199
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mortem examinations, as well as in the case law of the jurisdiction that
likely already exists. Furthermore, as seen in Williams, the Supreme Court
is open to the possibility of surrogate testimony as long as only the opinions
of the expert, not the underlying facts, are being admitted for their truth.202
Although it is true that video footage and pictures of the autopsy may
improve the ability of independent reviewers who did not perform the initial
autopsy to review the actions taken and draw similar or different
conclusions independent of the initial examiner, the later independent
reviews inherently cannot physically “redo” the autopsy. In other words, if
the first examiner conducts a procedure or test incorrectly or fails to test for
something, the results of the entire autopsy may be called into question.
Furthermore, it is true that those errors may not appear on, or be obvious in,
the video footage. However, the perfect should not be the enemy of the
good in this situation. Embracing the potential testimonial nature of autopsy
reports by preparing them as if future independent review is inevitable goes
a long way toward solving the current problem.203
CONCLUSION
The current state of the law regarding the testimonial status of forensic
hearsay is extremely vague and problematic, particularly with reference to
autopsy reports. Since 2004, the Supreme Court has produced fractured and
complicated opinions that have left lower courts to develop their own
varying doctrines with regard to the testimonial nature of autopsy reports. It
is therefore important that the Supreme Court grant certiorari on the issue.
Given the continuous state of confusion in this area, the Court should
eventually resolve the issue with new precedent. In light of the Court’s
previous jurisprudence, and the vocal stances of almost every justice
individually, it is likely that the Court may find autopsy reports testimonial
for the purposes of the Confrontation Clause. This, however, presents an
enormous problem for older murder prosecutions. This Comment’s
proposed solution to this problem is simple, but it takes cooperation from
the medical community. Ultimately, the courts should embrace the
testimonial nature of autopsy reports and capitalize on foreknowledge so
that they may be used at trial. In order to capitalize on this, the goal should
be the creation of autopsy reports with the possibility of a future trial in
mind, such that surrogate testimony will be reliable, independent from the
original conclusions, and clear enough that a jury can see with their own
eyes what the surrogate is talking about. Instead of pretending autopsies are
202
203

Williams v. Illinois, 132 S. Ct. 2221, 2235–36 (2012) (plurality opinion).
See supra notes 200–201 and accompanying text.

4. AMATO

2017]

4/21/2017 3:02 PM

ARE AUTOPSY REPORTS TESTIMONIAL?

323

independent, nontestimonial documents, as some scholars have tried to
suggest,204 the justice system should be doing the opposite. Embracing their
testimonial nature may ensure the admission of autopsies rather than their
exclusion.

204

See generally, e.g., supra note 14.
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